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A REEXAMINATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 2042 AS APPLIED TO CALIFORNIA
COMMIUNITY PROPERTY LAWS
Section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 requires the
inclusion of the proceeds of life insurance policies in the estate of the
insured, even though the proceeds are receivable by a beneficiary
other than the insured's executor, provided the insured "possessed
at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either
alone or in conjunction with any other person."'. The regulations to
the Code have provided a guide for determining whether the decedent
possessed the requisite incidents of ownership.2 They read in part:
[Tlhe term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to
ownership in the technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term
has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic
benefits of the policy. Thus; it includes the power to change the
beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to asign the policy, to
revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain
from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy,
etc. Similarly, the term includes a power to change the beneficiary
reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is sole stockholder.3
If the policy on the life of the insured is considered his separate
property, all the proceeds are included in the insured's gross estate
at his death if the requirements of section 2042 are met. If the same
policy is considered entirely community property, only one-half of the
policy-the insured spouse's community interest-is included in the
1 INT. REV. CODE op 1954, § 2042. This section further provides:
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) Receivable by the executor.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount re-
ceivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any
other person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'incident of
ownership' includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express
terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the
value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the
policy immediately before the death of the decedent. .. ."
2 See generally Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (1958).
3 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958). In the committee reports of the
Seventy-seventh Congress (1942) the situations embodied in the present regu-
ulations were described as examples of incidents of ownership. H.R. REP. No.
2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162-63 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
234-35 (1942). Case law also supported the regulation's list of examples. For
a listing of cases, see C. LowxDEs & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAxEs 280 n.34 (2d ed. 1962).
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SECTION 2042
insured's gross estate. In the normal situation the net estate tax is
the same in both instances because the marital deduction may be used
for policies that are separate property, but not for community policies.
The rationale of the decision of the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts to include only one-half of community policies in the insured's
gross estate, however, is subject to criticism in the light of recent
decisions and the express language of section 2042.
The regulations mention both a "power" and a "right" in regard
to incidents of ownership, but the two words are not synonymous.
4
Generally, the word "power" refers to the insured's ability to exercise
legally an incident of ownership according to the terms of the insur-
ance contract.5 A "right" refers to the insured's ability to affect
the economic benefits of the policy without incurring legal liability
once the power is exercised.6 Therefore, the distinction between a
power and a right to exercise an incident of ownership is a first step
toward the classification of the respective interests of the husband
and wife in a community policy. This classification is necessary in
order to determine whether the rationale of the decision to tax only
one-half the proceeds of community policies is correct. It is the
premise of this note that if the decedent-insured has a power to
exercise an incident of ownership his estate will include the value of
the policy regardless of the fact that he may not have a corresponding
right.
Recent decisions in separate property jurisdictions have inter-
preted section 2042 in terms of the "powers" and "rights" possessed
by the insured in the policies.7 Often, however, the courts have not
distinguished between a power and a right and the two words have
been used interchangeably.8 It is not necessary to draw this dis-
tinction when the insured possessed both a "power" and a "right"
to exercise incidents of ownership since if both are present the courts
have held that the entire life insurance proceeds are to be included in
the gross estate of the insured.9 If the decedent possessed neither a
4 See United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11
(Ist Cir. 1966); Estate of Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915, 925 (1968). The words "power"
and 'tight" as used in this comment do not correspond with Hohfeldian
terminology as expressed in W. HOHFELD, FUNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
(1923).
5 See Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1965);
United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir.
1966); Puchner v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 704, 709-10 (E.D. Wis. 1967); cf.
Estate of Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199, 203-04 (1966).
6 See United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11
(1st Cir. 1966).
7 E.g., United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st
Cir. 1966); Estate of Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
8 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1965);
Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1957).
9 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965); United
States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
May 1969]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
"power" nor a "right" to exercise an incident of ownership his estate
would not be taxed under section 2042,10 unless the insured possessed
a reversionary interest that exceeded five percent of the value of the
policy immediately before his death." It is possible, however, to
possess a "power" without a corresponding "right."'
2
This approach of examining the insured's interest-incidents of
ownership-in the policy in terms of "powers" and "rights" may affect
estate taxation of community life insurance policies. In order to deter-
mine the effect of viewing incidents of ownership in terms of "powers"
and "rights" upon life insurance taxation in California it is necessary
first to determine the type of interests possessed by each spouse under
the applicable state law and the resulting estate tax consequences
of that determination.
Ownership of Community Life Insurance
Policies in California
The entire proceeds of a non-community policy would be included
in the decedent-insured's gross estate' 3 because of the interests created
by the insurance contract unless the insured irrevocably assigned
the policy or gave away all the incidents of ownership before his
death14 but not in contemplation of it.' 5 Although depending upon
the insured's contract with the insurance company, it is likely that he,
as the insured or the named owner of the policy, will have both the
power and the right to exercise the incidents of ownership in the
entire policy.'0
In California, life insurance policies purchased from community
funds are ordinarily community property17 If part of the premiums
are paid from community funds and part from separate funds, own-
10 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 358 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.
1966); Estate of Crosley, 47 T.C. 310 (1966).
11 INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, § 2042 (2).
12 E.g., United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st
Cir. 1966); Estate of Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
'3 Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
14 E.g., Estate of Crosley, 47 T.C. 310 (1966); see Commissioner v. Es-
tate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 684 (1966). A contract between the insured and
others providing for the direction of the proceeds of the policy may effectively
deprive the insured of the "power" to change the beneficiaries. First Nat'1
Bank v. United States, 358 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1966).
15 INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 2035.
16 See, e.g., Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742, 743-44 (5th Cir.
1967).
17 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 175, 157 P.2d 841, 842 (1945)
(dictum); Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 444, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 47
(1960); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 606, 214 P.
61, 63 (1923); see Thurman, Federal Estate and Gife Taxation of Community
Property Life Insurance, 9 STAN. L. REV. 239, 250 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Thurman].
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ership is divided proportionately.' 8 If a husband takes out an insur-
ance policy on his life and pays all the premiums with community
funds, the wife owns a vested one-half interest in the policy.19 How-
ever, since the husband is given the power to manage all the com-
munity assets,20 the wife's interest in the policy during the existence
of the community is imperfect.
The decedent-insured in the case of a community policy enjoys
a more preferred status than does his counterpart with a non-com-
munity policy due to the effect of community property laws upon
the taxability of the proceeds of the policy.2 1 According to the regu-
lations, regard must be given to state law in determining taxability
under section 2042.22 The courts, in justifying the inclusion of only
one-half the proceeds of the community policy in the gross estate of
the insured, have relied upon the fact that state law gives the wife a
vested interest in the policy; the powers of management that the hus-
band possesses in the policy are not enough, however, to subject the
entire proceeds of the policy to taxation under section 2042.23
18 Estate of Sears, 182 Cal. App. 2d 525, 530, 6 Cal. Rptr. 148, 152 (1960);
Modem Woodmen of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 733-34, 299 P. 754,
755 (1931).
19 CAL. CIV. CODE § 161a. "The respective interests of the husband and
wife in community property during the continuance of the marriage relation
are present, existing and equal interests under the management and control
of the husband .... ." Id. See Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441,
445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (1960). The remainder of this note will deal exclusively
with situations in which it is assumed that premiums were paid entirely
from community funds.
20 CAL. CIV. CODE § 172. "The husband has the management and con-
trol of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposi-
tion, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, how-
ever, that he can not make a gift of such community personal property, or
dispose of the same without a valuable consideration ... without the written
consent of the wife." Id.
21 E.g., Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); see Thurman, supra note 17, at 256; cf. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (2), -(c) (5) (1958). However, it is possible to be at a
disadvantage in a community property state with regard to insurance poli-
cies. For example, in Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967),
a husband was the named owner of an insurance policy on his wife's life.
All of the premiums were paid from community funds. According to the
terms of the contract only the owner, if one was named in the policy, could
exercise any of the incidents of ownership. The court stated that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that the wife intended to make her husband
the absolute owner of the policy rather than the agent of the community.
Noting that the result would have been different if the policy were separate
property, the court included one-half of the proceeds in her gross estate.
22 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958).
23 Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959). "If the decision of the Tax Court is upheld,
consistency would require that the entire proceeds of insurance policies be
included in a husband's estate, notwithstanding his ownership of only half of
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The Nature of the Interests Possessed by the Husband and Wife
in Terms of Powers and Rights
Since, in California, the wife has a vested one-half interest in a
community insurance policy, it would seem she also owns the
"powers" and "rights" with respect to her interest. Thus, the hus-
band in a community property state does not in fact possess entirely
the powers and rights to which he is entitled under the terms of the
insurance contract. Nevertheless, since California has given the hus-
band the power of management and control over community funds,
he does hold the wife's powers and rights as her agent.24 The scope
of the agency is limited by California law in two respects: (1) During
the husband's life the wife can set aside a gratuitous assignment of
the policy to a third party or an irrevocable naming of a beneficiary
other than herself if she did not give her written permission;25 and
(2) After the husband's death the wife can recover one-half of the
proceeds of the policy if her husband revocably named someone
other than herself as the beneficiary and if she did not give her
written permission.26
These two limitations on the scope of the agency relationship
warrant examination. By the first limitation, the wife27 or her
estate28 has the ability to void her spouse's action. If the wife or her
estate elects to void her spouse's actions, the policy remains a corn-
the marital community. The results reached by the Tax Court (A) violate
principles of Texas community property law, (B) are contrary to the pre-1942
tax cases (now revitalized by the Revenue Act of 1948), and (C) frustrate the
national policy of tax equalization expressed in the Revenue Act of 1948 and
interpreted in the regulations carrying out that policy." Id. at 244. See
Thurman, supra note 17, where the author states that "[if... the policy is
a community asset in California, federal law is now clear that only one-half
of the proceeds will be included in the gross estate, the decedent being the
true owner under state law of no more than that portion, even where the
policy purports to vest in him all of the power enumerated in the Regula-
tions." Id. at 254-55. There have been no cases in the Ninth Circuit that
have considered the question since the incidents of ownership test became
embodied in section 2042 as a criterion of taxation. This is because the
Commissioner has not attempted to tax the entire proceeds of California
community policies. See Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154, 157 (9th Cir.
1967).
24 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958).
25 Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48
(1960) (dictum); Mundt v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 2d 416,
421, 95 P.2d 966, 969 (1939); CAL. Civ. CoDE § 172. See Britton v. Hamrnmel,
4 Cal. 2d 690, 692, 52 P.2d 221, 222 (1935).
26 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945) (dictum); Estate
of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (1960).
27 E.g., Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1935) (real es-
tate); Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal. App. 2d 614, 165 P.2d 54 (1946) (automobile);
see Thurman, supra note 17 at 260-61.
28 Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1962).
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munity asset.29 California law is clear, however, rthat the wife has
merely the ability to invalidate the gift and that the husband's act is
not a complete nullity.3 0 If the wife or her estate fails to void the
gift she will be deemed to have made a taxable gift of her interest to
the named beneficiary.3 1
By the second limitation, if the husband revocably names some-
one other than his wife as the beneficiary of the policy, the wife
cannot void her spouse's action during his life because the beneficiary
has a mere expectancy and there is nothing to void.3 2 After the
husband dies, however, the wife may elect to void the gift to the
named beneficiary as to one-half of the proceeds. 3s As was the re-
sult above, if the wife elects not to void the gift she will be deemed
to have made a taxable gift to the named beneficiary.3 4  Also, the
husband's act is not a nullity merely because the wife possesses the
ability to invalidate part of the attempted gift.
The above discussion indicates that the agency relationship be-
tween husband and wife created by California law and continuing
during the existence of the community, has limited the wife's actual
control over her interest in the economic benefits of the policy to her
ability to void only two actions of her spouse. All the other incidents
of ownership, except one, can be exercised by the husband without
any recourse by his wife. Thus, the husband can pledge the policy
for a community venture,3 5 assign it for consideration, 86 obtain a loan
29 E.g., Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1935) (real es-
tate); Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal. App. 2d 614, 165 P.2d 54 (1946) (automobile);
see Thurman, supra note 17 at 160-61.
30 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933); Dixon
Lumber Co. v. Peacock, 217 Cal. 415, 19 P.2d 233 (1933); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (1923); see Thurman, supra
note 17, at 251.
31 Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 254 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); cf. Thurman, supra note 17, at 251.
32 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 175-76, 157 P.2d 841, 842 (1945) (dic-
turn); Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (1960).
33 Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48
(1960). As to the method of voiding the gift to the named beneficiary,
"[the wife] could, of course, give notice to the insurance company of her
community claim, thereby preventing payment of her half interest to a third
party, but she could not disturb the policy during the husband's lifetime."
Id. at 446, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 48. But if an insurance company has paid the pro-
ceeds to the beneficiary in accordance with the terms of the policy, before any
notification from the wife, the company is fully discharged from all claims
under the policy. See CAL. INs. CoDE § 10172. If the wife failed to give notice
she could proceed against the named beneficiary. Thurman, supra note 17,
at 251.
34 Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 254 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); cf. Thurman, supra note 17 at 251.
35 Frick v. Frigidaire Corp., 119 Cal. App. 707, 7 P.2d 321 (1932).
36 See Farmers' Exch. Natl Bank v. Drew, 48 Cal. App. 442, 192 P. 105
(1920).
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against its surrender value,37 or surrender or cancel the policy.38 The
husband possesses all these powers and rights as the manager of the
community, and when the community is separated into the husband's
and wife's respective interests, the husband holds these powers and
rights as to one-half of the policy in his own right and to one-half as
his wife's agent.39
The exception to this coexistence of powers and rights in the hus-
band regards his use of the property as collateral for his separate
debts and obligations. 40 He may use the policy for this purpose, but if
so used the wife has a cause of action against her husband's estate.41
Therefore, the husband possesses a power, but not a corresponding
right, as to this incident of ownership.
The Scope of Section 2042
In order to determine the scope of inclusion under section 2042
it is necessary to examine its criteria for inclusion which are em-
bodied in three important phrases--"incidents of ownership," "pos-
sessed" by the decedent, and "either alone or in conjunction with any
other person."
"Incidents of Ownership"
A comprehensive definition of "incidents of ownership" is not
given in the statute. A broad definition is given by Commissioner
v. Chase Manhattan Bank,42 in which the court states: "[I] ncidents
of ownership of ... a policy are all the rights except the right to the
proceeds.'43 The regulations are helpful in determining what are the
incidents of ownership of an insurance policy, and it is there stated:
[T]he term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to
ownership of the policy in the technical legal sense. Generally speak-
ing the term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate
to the economic benefits of the policy ... 44
In United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company,45 the
court explained that the phrase "incidents of ownership" includes sit-
uations other than merely "the right of the insured or his estate to
87 Id. If the husband obtains a loan against the cash surrender value of
the policy or surrenders the policy, the money he receives is community
property. See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958).
38 Cf. Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45,
48 (1960).
39 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958).
40 Cf. Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45,
48 (1960).
41 Cf. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 563, 432 P.2d 709, 712, 63
Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
42 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
43 Id. at 245.
44 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958).
45 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
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the economic benefits of the policy." The court held:
First, it is clear that the reference to ownership in the "technical legal
sense" is not abandoned and supplanted by reference to "economic
benefits". Second, the regulation goes on to list illustrative powers
referred to by Congress in its reports. All of these are powers which
may or may not enrich decedent's estate, but which can affect the
transfer of the policy proceeds.
46
In Estate of Fruehauf,47 the majority of the court agreed with
the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company pronouncement and stated
that "the phrase has always been defined as a right affecting the
beneficial enjoyment of the insurance proceeds by beneficiaries
",48
Thus, an incident of ownership definitely exists if the insured
could benefit himself or his estate economically by the exercise of
the power. Additionally, if the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Com-
pany case and the majority in the Fruehauf case are correct, an inci-
dent of ownership exists if the insured merely could affect "the
transfer of the policy proceeds." 49
46 Id. at 11, quoting in part Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958).
47 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
48 Id. at 924. The concurring opinion seems to agree with the regula-
tion's definition. Id. at 926. Compare these definitions of incidents of owner-
ship with C. LowNDEs & R. KRA1mER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXEs 273 (2d
ed. 1962): "[Incidents of ownership mean any power over an insurance
policy which amounts to substantial ownership of the policy. .. ."
49 The distinction will become apparent with a few examples similar to
the facts in Estate of Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915 (1968). Assume an irrevocable
trust has been created which includes life insurance policies irrevocably as-
signed to it. Before the assignment, the beneficiary had been irrevocably
named. The trust was funded and had sufficient assets to pay the premiums
on the policies as they became due. Also assume that a named person was
to receive income for life from the trust and a different person would receive
the corpus when the life beneficiary died. The beneficiary of the policies was
not the beneficiary of the corpus of the trust.
If the insured was a trustee, consider the following two examples: (1.)
The insured was the life beneficiary of the trust. (2.) Someone other than
the insured was the life beneficiary of the trust.
In the first example the insured could have economically benefited
himself, by surrendering or cashing in the policies. He then would have
received a greater amount of income during his life because the cash sur-
render value would be added to the corpus of the trust.
In the second example the insured could not have economically benefited
himself, but could have affected the transfer of the policy proceeds by sur-
rendering, pledging or cancelling the policy.
See also Lowndes, Tax Consequences of Limitations Upon the Exercise
of Powers, 1966 DuKE L.J. 959. "[I]f W insured H's life and gave H power
to change the beneficiaries under the policy with the stipulation that H could
not make himself or his estate a beneficiary, the proceeds of the insurance
would be taxable to H's estate under Section 2042." Id. at 961 n.4.
In giving all the incidents of ownership to a trust, the insured could state
in the trust instrument that the trustees could only name the beneficiary from
1337May 19691 SECTION 2042
"Possessed"
If at his death the insured "possessed" an incident of ownership,
his estate will be taxed even though he did not have possession of
the policy,5 or did not pay any of the premiums, 1 or was under a
contractual obligation to transfer the policy to a trust.52 The estate
of the insured will also be taxed if the insured possessed an incident
of ownership even though the beneficiary (a corporation) paid the
premiums, used the policy as collateral for a business loan and car-
ried it on the corporate books as an asset of the corporation.
53 It is
this concept of "possession" that courts have had difficulty defining,
and the cases must be examined for the individual instances of "pos-
session" considered therein.
In Prichard v. United States,54 a life insurance policy was taken
out in the community property state of Texas. The wife of the in-
sured was named as the owner and beneficiary, but this action was
taken with the "understanding, agreement, and arrangement" that the
policy would be pledged as collateral for a community loan. As a re-
sult of this agreement, the insured received an economic benefit from
the pledge and the court held he therefore possessed an incident of
ownership at his death. The court concluded that for this reason one-
half of the proceeds of the policy should be included in the husband's
gross estate.55
In Commissioner v. Estate of Noel,5 6 a wife bought two flight
insurance policies on the life of her husband, who subsequently died
in the crash of the plane. Even though the husband did not have
possession of the policies during the flight and did not have the abil-
ity to exercise any incidents of ownership while on the plane, the
Supreme Court allowed the inclusion of the proceeds of the policies in
his gross estate. The decision was based upon the decedent's power
to exercise the incidents of ownership granted by the terms of the
insurance contract.
[E]state tax liability for policies "with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership" depends on
a limited class of people, and still avoid section 2042. Estate of Crosley, 47
T.C. 310 (1966).
50 Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per cur/am,
202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
51 Id.
52 Puchner v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
53 Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965).
54 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1968).
55 Id. The husband possessed incidents of ownership at all times. The
court raised the question whether the husband would have been taxed if he
had held no incidents of ownership in the policy but the wife had assigned
it as collateral for a community debt. Unfortunately, the court found this
question unnecessary to answer in order to determine the case before them.
Id. at 64.
56 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
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a general, legal power to exercise ownership, without regard to the
owner's ability to exercise it at a particular moment.57
In United States v. Rhode IsZand Hospital Trust Company,58 a
father took out insurance on the life of his son. The father kept the
policy in his possession and paid the premiums, but the son held the
incidents of ownership according to the terms of the contract. In re-
ply to the argument that the son had only a power to exercise inci-
dents of ownership and not a right to do so, the court made it clear
that a power, even without a corresponding right, is adequate to con-
stitute possession of incidents of ownership.
The existence of such powers in the decedent is to be distin-
guished from such rights as may have existed in decedent's father or
duties owed the father by decedent. It is therefore, no answer that
decedent's father- might have proceeded against him at law or in
equity. The company made it clear in the contract that it bore no
responsibility for the validity of an assignment, that it could pay a
beneficiary without recourse, and that it was under no obligation to
see to the carrying out of any trust. It even made it clear that a
beneficiary need only write to the home office to receive payment.
Should a third party-for example, an innocent creditor who had
given valuable consideration to decedent-receive the proceeds of the
policy, the proceeds of a loan on the policy, or the cash value, it could
not be said that the transaction between decedent and such third per-
son would in all such cases be nugatory. For decedent had some
powers-perhaps not rights, but powers-which could, if exercised
alone or in conjunction with another, affect the disposition of some
or all of the proceeds of the policy.59
The court also pointed out that the power to exercise incidents
of ownership held by the decedent was impregnable from attack by
evidence of the intentions of the father and decedent as to who was
to possess that power.0° This should be the result unless a mistake
was made by the agent who drafted the contract, so that it did not
reflect the original intent of the parties as expressed to the agent.61
In justifying its "power" rationale the court said:
While decisions against the estate of a passive but power-possess-
ing decedent may often conflict with the honest intentions and under-
standing of premium-paying beneficiaries and insureds, the alterna-
tive of abandoning the insistence of the governing nature of the con-
tract, in most cases, is less desirable. The drawing of a useful line
would be impossible; there would be a much wider range of varying
decisions on similar facts; and there would be an invitation to un-
principled estate manipulation. As a government counsel has pointed
out, there could always be a formally executed side agreement under
which the insured clearly surrenders to the beneficiary all his rights
to the policy, such agreement to be brought to light only in the event
of the decedent's dying before the beneficiary.62
57 Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
58 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
59 Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 12.
61 National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl.
1950); Estate of Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966); see United States v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1966).
62 355 F.2d at 13.
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Estate of Fruehauf63 went further than the Rhode Island Hos-
pital Trust Company case and held that an insured possessed incidents
of ownership if he held a power in a fiduciary capacity over an insur-
ance policy on his life. In the Fruehauf case Vera Fruehauf was the
sole owner of several insurance policies on the life of her husband.
All the powers and rights with respect to the policies were possessed
by Vera while she was alive. She predeceased her husband and be-
queathed the insurance policies to a testamentary trust that was to
be established by the executors of her estate. According to the pro-
visions of the trust the husband was to receive the trust income for
life, and the remainder, free of the trust, was to go to the then sur-
viving issue of Vera Fruehauf per stirpes. The husband was one of
three named trustees who were given broad powers to exercise the
incidents of ownership over the policies including the power to sur-
render them. A further provision of the trust instrument was that
the husband could receive a portion of the corpus of the trust, but
only as much as would be determined by the other two trustees.
The trust was never established, but when the husband died the
court included all the proceeds of the policies in his gross estate. To
the argument that the insured had no right to the economic benefits
of the policies the court stated: "The right of the insured or his
estate to the economic benefits of the policy is merely one of the
several incidents of ownership."64 To the contention that a fiduciary
who held incidents of ownership did not "possess" them, it held:
It would frustrate the manifest purpose of the statute if inclusion or
exclusion of the insurance proceeds in the decedent's estate is made
to depend on the capacity in which decedent held powers over the
policies rather than the extent of such powers held by decedent.6 5
Thus, the insured "possesses" an incident of ownership for pur-
poses of section 2042 if he has the legal power to exercise an incident
of ownership, regardless of the rights of others in the policy and re-
gardless of other extrinsic circumstances such as the lack of possession
of the policy, the inability to use the power at a particular moment,
or the capacity in which the power is held.
"Alone or In Conjunction with Any Ofher Person"
The meaning of "alone" is self-evident, and has not been particu-
larly important in this context, but the phrase "in conjunction with
any other person" has posed significant interpretative problems. If
the insured could participate in decisions with others in exercising
incidents of ownership he will possess an incident of ownership.66
These problems can be explained best by examining a few represen-
tative cases.
In Estate of Selznick,67 the decedent-insured was permitted to
63 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
64 Id. at 919.
65 Id. at 925.
66 E.g., Estate of Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
67 15 T.C. 716 (1950), affd per curiam, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952).
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cancel insurance policies held in trust if he first obtained the writ-
ten consent of the trustees. The court held that the proceeds of the
policy were to be included in the gross estate of the insured.
68
In Hall v. Wheeler,69 the court said that the decedent-insured
possessed during his life an incident of ownership even if the ap-
proval of the decedent's employing company-beneficiary was re-
quired in order to exercise it. 70 The insured had this ability sub-
ject to a veto by another, and this qualified as an incident of owner-
ship. In Estate of Goldstein v. United States,71 only the irrevocably
named beneficiary had the capacity, with the written consent of the
insured, to exercise any incidents of ownership. Although the in-
sured could not himself exercise any of the incidents of ownership
and possessed only an ability to veto, the court held that the insured
possessed an incident of ownership in conjunction with another per-
son.
72
In Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian,73 the court gave the
following explanation of the phrase:
It makes no difference whether under the trust instrument the de-
cedent may initiate changes or whether he must merely consent to
them.... If the decedent acting with others can effectively change
the beneficiary of the policy, he possesses an incident of ownership. 74
Thus, the phrase "in conjunction with any other person" in-
cludes situations in which the insured possesses only the ability to
veto attempts by others to exercise incidents of ownership, where a
third party has the ability to veto attempts to exercise incidents of
ownership by the insured, or where the insured could participate in
decisions with others in exercising incidents of ownership. In all
of the above cases the insured's policies will be included in his gross
estate.
Section 2042 as Applied to Community Policies in California
Rationale for Inclusion of Entire Community Policy
In the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company75 case the court
found that "[w]hat [Congress] was attempting to reach in Section
2042 . . .was the power to dispose of property .... 176 In Commis-
sioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank,77 the Fifth Circuit, deciding an es-
tate taxation question involving Texas community property, ex-
68 Id.
609 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959).
70 Id.
71 122 F. Supp. 677 (Ct. Cl. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
72 Id.
73 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956).
74 Id. at 199.
75 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
76 Id. at 10 (emphasis by the court).
77 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
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pressed the purpose of the statute as follows:
"We think it plain that [section 2042] imposes a death tax, not upon
the proceeds of insurance policies, the property of the estate, nor upon
the proceeds of insurance policies which but for the gift of the bene-
ficiary would be owned by decedent, but upon the cessation ... of
the control he had over the policies, [as agent of the community] so
that his death vested in the beneficiary a settled right which she did
not have before."78
The "power to dispose of property," which the Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Company case referred to and the "control over the policies,"
which the Chase Manhattan Bank case referred to, are both inter-
pretations of the word "possesses" as it is used in the statute. There
is no substantial difference between these two interpretations; the
difficulty is in the explanation of Chase Manhattan Bank as to the
control or power over the policy as it applied to community property.
That explanation is as follows:
In a community property state where insurance on the husband's
life is purchased with community funds, payable revocably to a third
person beneficiary, the husband's right to change the beneficiary and
all other control over the property are held as agent of the commu-
nity. The bundle of rights in the policy is owned by the community.
Something happens to this bundle when the insured dies, thereby
terminating his control over the property and bringing the commu-
nity to an end. What happens is, that the community's property
interests in the policy-rights are transformed into the beneficiary's
right to the proceeds. It is a shift in control and a shift of bene-
ficial interest. This is the transfer that is taxed.79
The problem lies in the court's statement that "the bundle of
rights in the policy is owned by the community," and that the hus-
band's "control" over the property is as agent of the community. Al-
though this statement is true, it alone does not resolve the question
of taxability under section 2042. Section 2042 is designed to tax only
interests of the insured. Since the community consists of two per-
sons, i.e., the husband and the wife, only one of them can be the in-
sured to whom the statute is meant to apply. Thus, the statute re-
quires an investigation into the nature of the community and a de-
termination of exactly what incidents of ownership were possessed
by the insured at the time of his death.
If under California law the wife possessed an equal one-half in-
terest in the policy and there were no other qualifications, there
would be no question that she would possess the incidents of owner-
ship as to her one-half. However, California does add a qualification,
i.e., the power of management that the husband possesses over
community assets. For the purpose of section 2042, the husband's
power of management makes him an agent for his wife's interest in
the community.80 Therefore, giving regard to California law, whether
78 Id. at 255, quoting Newman v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 449, 450 (5th
Cir. 1935).
79 259 F.2d at 255.
80 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958).
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the agency gives the husband any incidents of ownership over all the
policy becomes a question of fact.
For the purposes of section 2042, it is not essential to determine
what incidents of ownership the uninsured spouse possessed, but only
what the insured spouse possessed. California law may have given the
wife an absolute ability to devise a one-half interest in the policy,
but at the critical time of the insured's death he does possess some inci-
dents of ownership over the entire community policy which could
have been used to affect the economic benefits of the policy.
If the husband has a power to exercise an incident of ownership
in the policy his interest will be within the contemplation of the
term "possesses." Since the capacity in which an incident of owner-
ship is held is not crucial to taxation under section 2042, the fact that
the husband in California holds such powers merely as an agent of
his wife is not determinative. The primary question is whether the
interest the husband-insured possesses in the community insurance
policy is an incident of ownership.
Section 2042 requires only the possession of one incident of own-
ership to include the policy in the decedent's estate. If the position
is accepted that in order to come within the statute an incident of
ownership need only be an interest that can affect "the transfer of
the policy proceeds," it is obvious that in California the husband
possesses this incident. He can surrender, pledge, or cancel the pol-
icy. If an incident of ownership must be one that can affect the
economic benefit of the insured or his estate, the California husband
possesses this type as well. One example of the "affect the economic
benefit of the insured or his estate" type incident of ownership is
the power or capacity the husband possesses in his own right and
as the agent of his wife to cancel the policy. By this action the in-
sured could destroy the beneficiary's right to the proceeds and also
the possibility that the wife would receive one-half of the proceeds of
that particular asset against the named beneficiary. If the policy
were cancelled, the insured would obtain an economic benefit by not
having to pay the premiums from either his separate funds or from
community funds. A second example of the "affect the economic
benefit of the insured or his estate" type incident of ownership is the
power of the husband to assign the policy or to name irrevocably a
third person as the beneficiary of the policy if the wife does not con-
test the action. The wife could veto the action of her husband, but
the husband would determine the beneficiary of the policy, in con-
junction with his wife, if she failed to use her veto power. Together,
therefore, the husband and the wife do possess such an incident of
ownership. A third example of such an incident of ownership is the
husband's power to pledge the policy as collateral for his separate
debts and obligations. The husband does not have the right to pledge
the policy in the above manner, but he does have the power. The
wife has a right of action against the estate of the decedent, but a
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power without a corresponding right is still sufficient to include the
policy in the decedent's gross estate.
Ownership Versus Incidents of Ownership
In Freedman v. United States,8' a case involving taxation of
community property in Texas, the court said: "Section 2042 pre-
scribes ownership as the test [of inclusion of proceeds in the gross
estate of the insured] .. ".. ,s2 In Scott v. Commissioner,8  the
court agreed in stating: "In substance, at least in community prop-
erty cases, both the Commissioner and the courts have limited the
effect of the incidents of ownership to the interest in the policy that
belongs to the decedent."84
These two statements are repugnant to the expressed language
of the statute. The statute mentions incidents of ownership as the
test and not ownership per se. It is contended that ownership is not
meant to be the test of inclusion because the possession of only one
incident of ownership will cause the entire proceeds of the policy to
be included in the gross estate of the insured. The court, in United
States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company,8 5 expressed this
concept succinctly:
In the provision which was the predecessor of Section 2042, [Con-
gress] was not trying to tax the extent of the interest of the decedent.
*.. What it was attempting to reach in Section 2042 . . . was the
power to dispose of property .... Power can be and is exercised by
one possessed of less than complete legal and equitable title. The
very phrase "incidents of ownership" connotes something partial,
minor, or even fractional in its scope. It speaks more of possibility
than of probability.8 6
Thus, even though under California law the wife is the legal
owner of part of the policy or has an equal interest in the policy, it
still remains to be determined whether her husband as the community
manager possessed any of the incidents of ownership over the entire
policy exercisable either alone or in conjunction with her which would
include the entire amount of the proceeds in the decedent's estatesT
The conclusion is inescapable that if the courts gave effect to the
California law providing that the husband is the manager of the
community funds, they would necessarily be forced to include in his
gross estate the entire proceeds of the policy.
81 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967).
82 Id. at 748.
83 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
84 Id. at 157.
85 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966)-
86 Id. at 10 (emphasis by the court).
87 Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564, 567 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per
curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953); cf. Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner,
340 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1953).
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History of the Incidents of Ownership Test of Section 2042
In order to determine whether the courts should adopt the rea-
soning of the preceding discussion-that California law dictates in-
clusion of the entire community policy in the husband's gross estate
under section 2042-it is necessary to review the history of federal es-
tate taxation of life insurance.
The federal statute8 8 that first determined estate tax conse-
quences of life insurance policies appeared in 1918 and remained in
force until 1942. It stated that the gross estate of the decedent would
include policies
to the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the
extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other
beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent
upon his own life.S9
The criteria for taxation under the regulations was whether the
insured either directly or indirectly paid the premiums of the pol-
icy.90 This "payment of premiums" regulation, with minor changes,
remained in force until 1931. In 1931, the Treasury Department
adopted the "incidents of ownership" test,91 which continued until
1941, when a shift back to the "payment of premiums" test was
made.
2
In 1942, Congress enacted by statute both the "payment of pre-
miums" and the "incidents of ownership" tests for determining estate
tax consequences of life insurance.93 In the same year, an insurance
provision regarding community property life insurance was adopted
by Congress which specifically provided for the inclusion of all the
proceeds of the policy in the estate of the insured.94 This provision
was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1948, which, however, continued
the alternative tests for inclusion.9 5
After 1948, for the first time, the courts had to interpret a stat-
ute, rather than a regulation, which embodied the incidents of own-
ership test for determining the taxation of community life insurance
policies without specifically requiring the inclusion of the entire pro-
ceeds of the policy in the insured's gross estate.
88 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (1919).
89 Id.
90 Treas. Reg. 37, arts. 32, 34-35 (1921); Treas. Reg. 37, art. 32 (1919).
91 T.D. 4296, IX-2 Cum. BULL. 427 (1930).
92 Treas. Reg. 80, art. 25, T.D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 427.
93 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (1919), as amended,
Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 944 (1942).
94 Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 942 (1942).
95 Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351(a), 62 Stat. 116-17 (1948).
In the 1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress abandoned
the "payment of premiums" test, and the "incidents of ownership" test became
the sole criterion for taxability. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2).
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After the repeal in 1948 of the 1942 provision taxing all the com-
munity policy proceeds, the courts,96 the regulations,9T and the
commentators9" assumed that the decisions rendered during the
period from 1918 to 1942, which determined the extent of inclusion of
community life insurance policies in the gross estate of the dece-
dent-insured, would be revitalized and become precedent for inter-
preting the relevant sections of the Revenue Act of 1948. Two such
cases, decided in 1938 and 1940 respectively, frequently cited9 9 as estab-
lishing that only one-half of the proceeds should be included in
community property states under the 1948 Act, are Lang v. Commis-
sioner 0 0 and De Lappe v. Commissioner.' Both cases were decided
under section 402 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1918.
In the Lang case the Supreme Court was not faced with a statute
that defined the test of includability in terms of "incidents of owner-
ship" and therefore its authority for interpreting incidents of owner-
ship is questionable. The court in Lang did not consider the newly-
formulated Regulation 80102 which expressed the incidents of own-
ership test for inclusion, because the regulation was not applicable
when the case arose. The decision rested on an interpretation of
Treasury Regulation 70,103 which was the "payment of premiums"
test. In its conclusion, the Court explained why Regulation 70 did
not apply to the community insurance policy:
Where children were named beneficiaries and premiums were
paid from community funds the situation is not within the precise
words of the Regulations; but the rather obvious reason underlying
the definition of what constitutes a policy "taken out by the assured"
should be respected. In the absence of a clear declaration it cannot
be assumed that Congress intended insurance bought and paid for
with the funds of another than the insured and not payable to the
latter's estate, should be reckoned as part of such estate for the pur-
poses of taxation.10 4
In the De Lappe case, Regulation 80105 was in effect, but the
court refused to apply it. The Court observed:
It is elementary that a treasury regulation can not change the
96 E.g., Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959). "[I]n repealing the controversial pro-
visions of the Revenue Act of 1942 and enacting the Revenue Act of 1948
Congress revitalized the pre-1942 interpretations of community property law."
Id. at 252.
97 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (2),(c) (5) (1958).
98 E.g., Thurman, supra note 17, at 154-56.
99 Commssioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 254 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); see Thurman, supra note 17, 255-56
& n.91.
100 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
101 113 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1940).
102 Treas. Reg. 80, art. 27 (2), T.D. 5032, 1941 Cum. BuLL. 427.
108 Treas. Reg. 70, arts. 25, 28 (1926).
104 304 U.S. at 270.
105 Treas. Reg. 80, art. 27 (2), T.D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 427.
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law but it is unnecessary to strike down Art. 25 of Regulation No. 80
for the purpose of deciding this case. The regulations follow the law
except wherein it attempts to define ownership in the policy ....
[Ijncidents of ownership are not conclusive but merely create a
presumption of ownership that may be rebutted.... [Incidents of
ownership] could be given to an agent without his having any owner-
ship in the policy at all. In these instances, where the premiums on a
policy have been paid out of community funds the husband is acting
only as an agent....
... In computing estate taxes on the proceeds of life insurance
the question to be decided is whether the decedent paid all or only
part of the premiums .... [T]he interest of decedent in the policies
at the time of his death was only one-half. Regulation 80 could not
and did not change this.
106
Again the court used ownership and interests and not incidents of
ownership as criteria for determining inclusion. It is true, as the
court stated, that if the incidents of ownership were given to an
agent he would not have any ownership rights in the policy, but
whether he possessed an incident of ownership as required by section
2042 in order to include the proceeds of the policy in the gross
estate is an entirely different question.
Even though the Lang and De Lappe cases were not decided un-
der a statute expressing incidents of ownership as the criterion of
inclusion, Congress could have intended to revive the rationale of
these decisions by the enactment of the applicable sections of the
Revenue Act of 1948. Therefore, an examination of the congressional
intent behind section 2042 will be helpful in understanding the scope
of the incidents of ownership test.
Congressional Intent Behind Section 2042
The Senate Committee reports dealing with the Revenue Act of
1948 are helpful in determining the congressional intent of section
2042. In the reports, much attention was given to the community
property amendments of 1942 which related to the sections taxing
the interest owned by the decedent, but little was given to the insur-
ance section, section 2042. One paragraph, however, does shed some
light on the latter section.
This section, which is unchanged from the bill as passed by the
House, repeals, effective with respect to estates of decedents dying
after the date of enactment of this bill, section 811(g) (4) [provision
including all proceeds of community policy in gross estate] of the
Code, relating to community property in the case of life insurance.
Since section 811(g) [defining inclusion] was completely rewritten in
the Revenue Act of 1942, the repeal prospectively of section 811 (g)
(4) makes applicable to decedents dying after the date of enactment
of this bill the rules of section 811 (g) which would be applicable had
paragraph (4) never been contained in section 811(g).107
Thus, it is clear that in the Revenue Act of 1948, Congress in-
tended the incidents of ownership test to be the law, and not return
to the 1918 Revenue Act under which the Lang and De Lappe cases
106 113 F.2d at 51 (emphasis added).
107 S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (Supp. 1948).
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were decided. Consequently, new impetus was given by the 1948
Act to the incidents of ownership clause, which remained embedded
in the statute rather than in a regulation.
It is also clear that Congress intended that the insured in a
community property state should be taxed only on one-half of the
proceeds payable to his spouse. This is substantiated by the fact
that the marital deduction 08 was given at this time to taxpayers
possessed of separate property. The marital deduction was created
by Congress in order to equalize taxation between residents of sep-
arate and community property states. However, it is also apparent
that Congress intended to continue the incidents of ownership test
and not an interest test as the criterion of taxability.
If the proceeds of the policy were not payable to the surviving
spouse, no marital deduction would be available to residents of sep-
arate property states, so the entire proceeds of the policy would be
taxable in the decedent's gross estate if he retained an incident of
ownership. Under the same facts in a community state, however,
only one-half of the proceeds would be included in the insured's
gross estate, and thus one-half of the policy would escape estate taxa-
tion. The preferential treatment afforded residents of community
property states in this situation would be measured by the difference
between the estate tax on one-half of the proceeds of the policy and
the gift tax paid by the surviving spouse upon the gratuitous transfer
of her one-half interest.10 9 Unfortunately, it is not possible to se-
cure a marital deduction for the insured's estate in a separate prop-
erty state when the proceeds are not payable to the surviving
spouse." 0 The difference in .the tax which the community resi-
dents would pay as opposed to separate property residents in cases
in which the proceeds were paid to a person other than the surviving
spouse, would be small. Perhaps the best solution would be to allow a
marital deduction for community property life insurance only if the
proceeds are payable to the surviving spouse. Unfortunately, a statute
would be required for this solution.
By the enactment of the marital deduction provision, Congress
was attempting to equalize the tax burdens upon residents of sep-
arate and community property states,"' but in the case of life
insurance it was not completely successful." 2  If there were a
change in the present interpretation of section 2042 requiring the
108 INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 2056.
109 This is assuming that the gift tax would be lower than the estate
tax in this situation and that the wife consented to the gift.
110 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (6).
111 S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1948); see Commissioner v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
913 (1959).
112 S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1948): "It is recognized
that complete equalization of the estate and gift taxes cannot be achieved
because of the inherent differences between community property and non-
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inclusion of all the proceeds of a community policy, where the spouse
is the beneficiary it would result in a greater inequality toward resi-
dents of community property states than now exists toward residents
of separate property states. Nevertheless, the expressed intent of
Congress was to keep incidents of ownership as the test of inclu-
sion for section 2042 and this intent is expressed in the statute.
The question is still unanswered whether the intent of Congress as
expressed in the Committee Reports-that only one-half the proceeds
of a community policy should be included in the gross estate-can
overcome their expression of a contrary intent-that the incidents of
ownership test should govern inclusion-in the statute. The regula-
tions have expressed the intent found in the Senate reports,113 but
they cannot contradict the statute.114
If the ownership interests as defined in California existed in a
separate property state, there is little doubt that the entire proceeds
would be included in the gross estate of the insured. Giving consid-
eration to California law should not necessarily produce a different
result from that of a separate property state. The regulation" 5
stating that the agency does not create any incidents of ownership in
the insured for the purposes of section 2042 should be carefully ex-
amined to ascertain whether it is not contrary to the expressed lan-
guage of the statute.
When the Uninsured Spouse Dies First
In most California cases involving the estate tax consequences of
community property. However the new provisions will result in equality in
the important situations."
"13 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (b) (2) (1958): "If the proceeds of an insurance
policy made payable to the decedent's estate are community assets under the
local community property law and, as a result, one-half of the proceeds be-
longs to the decedent's spouse, then only one-half of the proceeds is consid-
ered to be receivable by or for the benefit of the decedent's estate." Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958): "As an additional step in determining whether
or not a decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in a policy or any part
of a policy, regard must be given to the effect of the State or other applicable
law upon the terms of the policy. For example, assume that the decedent
purchased a policy of insurance on his life with funds held by him and his
surviving wife as community property, designating their son as beneficiary
but retaining the right to surrender the policy. Under the local law, the
proceeds upon surrender would have inured to the marital community. As-
suming that the policy is not surrendered ... on the decedent's death, the
wife's transfer of her one-half interest in the policy was not considered ab-
solute before the decedent's death. Upon the wife's prior death, one-half of
the value of the policy would have been included in her gross estate. Under
these circumstances, the power of surrender possessed by the decedent as
agent for his wife with respect to one-half of the policy is not, for purposes
of this section, an 'incident of ownership,' and the decedent is, therefore,
deemed to possess an incident of ownership in only one-half of the policy."
114 See De Lappe v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1940).
115 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (5) (1958).
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a community life insurance policy the insured has predeceased his
spouse, but this is not always the situation. For example, in Scott v.
Commissioner,116 the court was asked to determine the estate tax
consequences for the estate of the insured when the insured died
after his wife.
Raymond Scott purchased policies of insurance on his life, and
all the premiums were considered to have been paid from commu-
nity funds." 7 Raymond's wife, Ruth, predeceased her husband,
and her estate included one-half of the cash surrender value of the
policies. The wife bequeathed the residue of her estate, which in-
cluded her one-half ownership interest in the policies, to her two sons.
After Ruth's death, Raymond Scott changed the beneficiary of the
policies to his two sons. He continued to pay all the premiums after
his wife's death." 8 Two months before his death he borrowed on
the policies, but did not cash the check. In valuing Raymond's es-
tate, his executor included one-half of the proceeds of the policies
plus one-half of the loan. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency
which resulted in the inclusion of the entire value of the policies
plus the amount of the loan, less the cash surrender value of the
policies which was included in the wife's estate. The Tax Court
upheld the Commissioner's view, but the court of appeals reversed
and arrived at a valuation of its own." 9
The court of appeals stated that although the value of the poli-
cies in the wife's estate was included only at cash surrender value, it
did not follow, as the Commissioner had argued, that this was all
the interest she owned in them. She also owned the bundle of
rights that accompanied her one-half ownership, which she could pass
to her two sons . 20  Contrary to the executor's reasoning, the one-
half interest which the wife passed did not automatically stay at a
one-half ownership interest. After the wife died, the sons and Ray-
mond owned the policies as tenants in common.' 2' But because
Raymond continued to pay the premiums, he began to acquire an
interest in the sons' share of the policies.122  Thus, the ownership
116 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
17 Id. at 156 n.1. "In his brief before the Tax Court the Commis-
sioner stated 'The tax consequences of any separate property payments prior
to marriage * * * have been ignored on a de minimis basis."' Id.
118 374 F.2d at 161. The sons actually paid part of the premiums but
the Commissioner treated these payments as a loan and this was not chal-
lenged. The error in failing to challenge had serious estate tax consequences
as can be seen from the discussion accompanying notes 121-23, infra.
"39 43 T.C. 920 (1965), rev'd, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
120 374 F.2d at 159.
121 Id. at 161.
122 Id. The court used an analogy to McBride v. McBride, 11 Cal.
App. 2d 521, 54 P.2d 480 (1936), where a community was dissolved by divorce.
The California court held that after the divorce the parties became tenants in
common as to the life insurance policy which was previously an asset of the
community. Since the insured continued to pay the premiums the (former)
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interest the sons possessed diminished as Raymond paid each premium.
In valuing Raymond's estate the court said:
The proportionate part of the proceeds that is attributable to those
premiums [paid by Raymond after his wife's death] is therefore in-
cludible in his estate. One-half of the balance of the proceeds,
attributable to premiums paid during the marriage from community
funds, belonged to the sons, and is to be excluded from Raymond's
estate, whether that amount be larger or smaller than one-half of the
cash surrender value of the policies at the time of Ruth's death.123
The first problem encountered in determining whether the Scott
case is correct is the characterization of the interest in the policies
which Ruth actually passed to her two sons. The court quoted a
California case 124 in which an uninsured spouse predeceased her
husband, which held: "'the wife's interest was 'present, existing and
equal' and was a vested interest and. . . she has equal testamentary
power with the husband.' "125 Thus, it is evident that the full
"bundle of rights" passed to the two sons. Consequently, the sons
should have had all the powers and rights in the policy with respect
to their interest in their own right without any agency relationship.
The difficulty with this appraisal is that according to the terms
of the insurance contract Raymond still possessed all the incidents of
ownership and the sons possessed none. The conclusion to be drawn
must be that Raymond held his sons' incidents of ownership as a
fiduciary in constructive trust.126
If Raymond exercised any incidents of ownership over the sons'
portion of the policies without their permission it would have been a
breach of his fiduciary relationship. Raymond held all the powers in
the policies, but not all the rights. He may have been answerable in
an action at law or in equity, but he had the ability to affect the
economic benefits of the policies, and, therefore, he possessed an inci-
dent of ownership. All the proceeds of the policy should have been
included in his estate.12
7
If either of the sons had died before the insured, his estate
wife's interest diminished. Her interest in the policy was represented by
one-half of the premiums paid from community funds.
123 374 F.2d at 161.
124 Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1960).
125 374 F.2d at 158, quoting Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441,
445, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (1960).
126 If this assumption is correct, Ruth actually did not have the power
to pass an absolute interest in the policy. If she had passed an absolute
interest her sons would have possessed the "incidents of ownership" in their
own right, regardless of what the contract said.
127 Even if it is proper in community property cases to limit the effects
of the insured's incidents of ownership to the interest in the policy that be-
longed to him, there was no reason to apply that limitation in the Scott case.
After Ruth died the policies were not held by the sons and Raymond as
community property. The Commissioner might have been able to argue the
point successfully, but apparently he chose not to. See 374 F.2d at 157-58.
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clearly would have had to pay estate taxes on the interest that he
owned at the time of his death under section 2033 of the Internal
Revenue Code.128  The value of that interest would be determined
by the cash surrender value or the replacement value of the policies;
it would be limited to one-half the value of the interests of the two sons
at that time. Each of the sons also would have had the testamentary
power over his share, and the person who took his interest would
have received this very valuable asset.
The fact that the husband paid all the premiums does not imply
that he made a gift to the sons since he received adequate and full
consideration, i.e., a greater interest in the policies.1 29  The same
result would obtain if the sons paid the premiums.
The next issue is whether the sons had a right to insist upon
paying one-half of the premiums in order to keep their one-half in-
terest intact. It would seem that they would have such a right since
they were one-half owners of the policy, and the husband did not
have any powers of management after the wife died. In order to
protect the insured, insurance companies might include in their con-
tracts a provision to the effect that the insured has the right to pay
the premiums if he so desires. Whether this right would be consid-
ered an incident of ownership would be for the determination of the
courts.
Estate Planning Under the Scott Decision
To avoid question as to the party having the right to pay the
premiums, either the sons or Raymond could have caused a partition
of the policy into equal halves.130 If the insured wished to shed
the incidents of ownership by making a gift in order to avoid paying
taxes under section 2042, he could do so. He would incur liability to
pay a gift tax, however, but only as to his share. Even if the insured
continued to pay the premiums until his death he would have no in-
terest in the policies.
128 "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his
death." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033. There is a conflict between the valua-
tion of life insurance policies in the estate of the uninsured owner in com-
munity and separate property states. Compare United States v. Steward,
270 F.2d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960) (cash surren-
der value), with DuPont v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210 (3rd Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956), affg 18 T.C. 1134 (1952) (interpolated terminal
reserve value of the policy); see Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a) (1958).
The interpolated terminal reserve value method also is used for gift tax
purposes. United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941); Guggenheim v. Ras-
quin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941).; see Treas. Reg. 25.2512-6(a) (1958); C. LOwNDES &
R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs 278-88, 469-70 (2d ed. 1962).
129 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512 (b).
130 See Brawerman, Life Insurance in Community Property Estate Plan-
ning, U. So. CAL. 1951 TAx INST. 47, 74-75.
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The last three premiums paid before the insured's death, how-
ever, would be in contemplation of death, and some estate tax
would have to be paid.1' 1 The Internal Revenue Service has issued
a Revenue Ruling13 2 to the effect that the valuation in the latter
situation is the ratio of the premiums paid in contemplation of death
over the total premiums paid, times the proceeds of the policy, rather
than the dollar amount of the premiums. Fortunately for estate plan-
ners and taxpayers, this ruling seems to be incorrect and one court
has expressly said so.1
33
If a life insurance policy is in any part community property and
the spouse predeceases the insured and bequeathes her interest in
the policy to someone other than her surviving spouse, and the par-
ties are cooperative, the estate planner has various options to consider.
First and most obvious is to have the third party pay all the premi-
ums in order to minimize the estate taxes of the insured and to ac-
quire a greater interest in the policy. If the insured wished to rid
himself immediately of his entire interest, this could easily be done
by way of a gift. It has also been suggested that the parties could
ask for a partition of the policy into two separate policies with each
owning their interest outright and there being no tenancy in com-
mon.'3 Many other avenues are open to avoid the thrust of sec-
tion 2042, but this subject is beyond the scope of this note.
1 35
Conclusion
Community property law affects ownership interests, and in
order to determine the estate tax consequences of that determination
it is necessary to give regard to applicable state laws. But the
courts must give regard to all portions of California's community
property laws, including the power of management over commun-
ity funds. Thus, it is necessary to examine closely the insured's in-
terest in order to determine whether he "possessed at his death any
of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunc-
tion with any other person."
In view of the foregoing it is apparent that if the recommen-
dations of this note are followed, drastic changes would result in the
131 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035 (b).
132 Rev. Rul. 67-463, 167 INT. REv. BULL. No. 52, at 15.
133 Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968): "[TJhe
Ruling is unfounded in either the statute or the case law, and any reliance
placed upon the Ruling by service must be rejected by this court." Id. at 230.
Cf. Nance v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 12,529 (D. Ariz. 1968).
134 See Brawerman Life Insurance in Community Property Estate Plan-
ning, U. So. CAL. 1951 TAX INsT. 47, 74-75.
135 See generally Brawerman Life Insurance in Community Property
Estate Planning, U. So. CAL. 1951 TAx INST. 47; Brawerman & Holcomb, How
to Use Life Insurance in Community Property, U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX INST. 495;
Osborn, Gifts of Life Insurance as an Element in Estate Planning, N.Y.U. 26TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1335 (1968); Thurman, supra note 17.
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field of estate taxation. However, the insured still could irrevocably
assign all the incidents of ownership before his death and not in
contemplation of death and avoid any estate tax consequences. He
could also have his wife purchase policies on his life and have her
pay the premiums from her separate funds to avoid section 2042.
But unless this action is taken, or until the appropriate legislation is
enacted, one-half of the proceeds of community life insurance will
continue to be includible in the gross estate of the insured by the
application of section 2042.
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